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Abstract 
There is a growing body of research that suggests much of the behaviour that occurs 
during a disaster response effort is emergent, meaning it is produced as a result of 
complex non-linear factors at work both within and between the affected 
communities, responding organisations, and the environment. This paper uses the 
pluvial floods of June 2007 in Kingston upon Hull as a case study to investigate to 
what extent emergence was apparent during the disaster response effort, as well as 
identifying certain systemic features that facilitate or inhibit this emergence. Results 
show that emergent behaviours corresponding to each of the types identified in the 
literature (emergent groups, networks, and activities) were present in the response to 
the June 2007 floods; and that these behaviours contributed positively to Hull’s 
community resilience. Both altruism and the relative rate of information transfer were 
key drivers for emergent actions. 
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Introduction 
Over recent years there has been an increasing interest in what are termed non-
structural or ‘soft’ engineering solutions to flood risk (and indeed hazard management 
in general). Of these non-structural methods, preparedness strategies are of particular 
interest, as these outline the overall organisational strategy during times of hazard, the 
protocols that attempt to regulate the actions of the various actors involved, and the 
levels of authority they are imbued with. However, it has been observed that given 
that disaster management plans operate at times of unreliable information, acute time 
pressures and inadequate communication systems (Smith and Ward 1998) no 
preparedness strategy can account for the multitude of unexpected events precipitated 
by a major flood event. It has therefore been suggested that planning should seek to 
enhance the adaptive capacity of the community and ideas emerging from complex 
system theory have been proposed as a means to produce such a strategy (Comfort 
1999; Hilhorst 2004; Johnson 2006; Smith and Fischbacher 2009; Stallings and 
Quarantelli 1985; Tierney and Trainor 2003). 
 
In disaster circumstances the usual processes and structures of emergency response 
are often overwhelmed (Tierney and Trainor 2003) and consequently a linear, 
hierarchical response is generally the exception rather than the rule. The consequent 
assertion that some degree of non-linear, emergent behaviour is both inevitable and 
natural (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985) is supported by a number of case studies 
across a range of disaster scenarios and levels of development (Comfort 1999; 
Tierney and Trainor 2003). Consequently these emergent behaviours have been the 
subject of considerable research interest (NRC 2006), not least because response 
networks that display greater proportions of emergent organisational behaviours are 
more successful in limiting the impact of hazards (Comfort 1999). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine to what extent emergent behaviours were 
evident in the response effort during the Hull floods of June 2007. The relative 
prevalence of different forms of emergent behaviour will also be examined,  
 
Hull floods, 2007 
Hull is located in the north east of England on the banks of both the River Humber 
estuary and the River Hull. It is a particularly low-lying area, with over 90% of its 
area below high tide level (Environment Agency, 2008a), indeed some parts of the 
city are below sea level (Coulthard et. al., 2007a). Because much of the land on which 
Hull stands is reclaimed marshland, it has limited natural drainage, and this combined 
with its low-lying position means it is particularly vulnerable to flooding 
(Environment Agency, 2008a) as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Hull area showing important hydrological features, 
infrastructure, and flood vulnerability (Source: Environment Agency (2008b).  
 
Areas to the west of the city are located on higher ground than the majority of the 
city, and so water falling here drains eastward toward the city (Coulthard et. al., 
2007a). There are also slightly higher areas to the east of the city, and so at times of 
high tide when sluice gates to the Humber are closed, the area around Hull acts like a 
large bowl (Pratt, 2008). The presence of a chalk aquifer beneath the western part of 
the city also contributes to flood risk, as it can lead to a high water table and saturated 
ground during periods of heavy rain (Yorkshire Water, 2008). In total the 
Environment Agency (2008b) estimates there are 57,000 properties at risk of flood in 
the Hull catchment. 
 
June 2007 was the wettest month in Yorkshire since 1882. The rainfall for the UK 
during this period is shown in Figure 2. Hull received over 400% of its monthly 
average rainfall during June 2007. On June 25th 2007 Hull experienced a storm of 
magnitude greater than 1 in 150 years (Coulthard et. al. 2007b), with over 100mm of 
rain falling on the city over a period of 24-hours (Environment Agency 2008a). This 
volume of rainfall overwhelmed the drainage network of the city, resulting in surface 
water flooding. While many parts of the city were affected, flooding was more 
extensive and severe in western parts of the city. 
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Figure 2: Precipitation (mm) falling on the UK during June 2007 as a % of 
monthly average (Source: Met Office, 2007; annotation added). 
 
Flood preparedness is particularly relevant to the city of Kingston upon Hull, which 
has 90% of its area below the high tide level (Environment Agency 2008a). Nearly 
10,000 properties were flooded during the pluvial floods of June 2007, causing 
extensive damage and misery to Hull’s residents. Damage to Council property alone 
was estimated at nearly £200 million (Coulthard et. al. 2007a). During the floods 
roads in affected areas became impassable for 2 days and 91 of Hull’s 99 schools 
were forced to close. The flooding affected the communities of Bransholme and 
Kingswood in East Hull, the low lying areas by East Carr, and large areas of 
Orchard Park, Newland Avenue, the Avenues, Priory Road/East Ella and Anlaby 
Park in the west of the city (Coulthard et. al. 2007b). The affected communities 
represented a cross section of the Hull population, with diverse socio-
demographic characteristics. The flood itself continued for several days before the 
waters retreated, and standing water remained in many parks and other open areas for 
weeks (Environment Agency 2008a). Given the extent of the disaster in Hull, study of 
the emergency response system provides the opportunity to uncover important 
information about emergent behaviours in disaster management. 
 
The core data for this study comes from the various official reports (both internal and 
independent), media reports from the time, as well as from the field, in the form of 
structured interviews with key figures from various responding agencies, ‘shadowing’ 
of certain officials involved in flood recovery activities, and discussions with affected 
Kingston 
upon Hull 
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citizens and responders from the various groups. Organisations of interest were 
identified by analysing the aforementioned reports and accounts of the floods, and 
through communications with academics who are either conducting their own studies 
of the June 2007 floods, or have been heavily involved in published reports 
(Coulthard 2008 pers. comm.). Groups who were involved in the field work and 
interviews include: 
 Hull City Council 
 Silver Command 
 The Hull Community Wardens 
 The Environment Agency 
 Flood affected Residents 
 
The account of the flood begins with a description of the roles and responsibilities of 
key organisations, followed by an account of the unfolding of the disaster and the 
immediate responses gleaned from interviews and grouped into an analysis of the 
extent of emergent behaviour during the event.  
 
Roles and responsibilities 
Silver Command 
When an emergency situation is declared in the UK, a central multi-agency 
Gold/Silver/Bronze Control is convened by the Police in order to coordinate the 
response effort, when it is deemed there is a fear or threat to property. Depending on 
the perceived seriousness of the emergency this team has varying authority and 
membership; an emergency of only moderate severity precipitates the formation of a 
“Bronze Command”, while the most serious events (such as a major terrorist attack or 
nuclear accident) would lead to the formation of a “Gold” command.  Humberside 
Police instigated a Silver Control structure on the morning of 25th June that the Hull 
floods called for the creation of a “Silver” Command. The Police establish the Silver 
Command and invite responders to that command, and will take advice from other 
responders. However, Coulthard et. al. (2007a) reports that there was a degree of 
confusion between agencies about whose responsibility it was to instigate a Silver 
Command, though the extent to which this led to a delay in establishing top-level 
coordination is unclear.  
 
While Silver Command seems to have been established relatively quickly, it appears 
to have taken longer for the body to establish a picture of what was occurring and 
begin allocating resources. Coulthard et. al. (2007a) comment on the lack of local 
knowledge present in Silver Command and note that there was no readily available 
information highlighting important strategic locations. This appears to have meant 
that the early phases of Silver Commands response were reactive, and concerned with 
information gathering. 
 
Initially Silver Command was made up of representatives from Hull City Council, the 
Police, Fire Brigade, certain National Health Service (NHS) bodies, and the 
Environment Agency. Yorkshire Water requested a representative early on Monday 
25th  June, however it was not until Wednesday that they were invited to join the team 
(Coulthard et. al. 2007a; Yorkshire Water 2008). The director of Hull’s Community 
Wardens was also brought into Silver Command on Wednesday. Silver Command 
was in place for around a week, being dissolved on the Monday following the floods. 
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Responsibility for coordinating the recovery effort was then handed over to Hull City 
Council.  
 
Hull City Council 
Hull City Council has responsibilities for providing housing and shelter for those 
affected, emergency planning, working with other category 1 responders during an 
event to provide emergency assistance, as well as duties in the recovery phase post 
hazard. Specific responsibilities include warning members of the public of potential 
threats in the lead-up to an event, traffic management during disasters with emphasis 
on keeping important routes clear for use by the emergency services (Red Routes), 
offering assistance and potentially evacuation to elderly and/or vulnerable people, and 
responsibility for setting-up and maintaining rest and care centres for people to be 
evacuated to.  
 
The Council is structured with a central coordinating and administrative team at Hull 
town hall, and seven ‘Area Teams’ that coordinate Council services within their 
district. Because of the lack of prior warning, the Council had little time to plan its 
response, and there was no emergency plan in place specifically for pluvial flooding 
(emergency plans at the time were based solely on fluvial events), although there 
were generic protocols for use in all emergencies. A common sentiment present in the 
comments of all of the Council staff spoken with was that the pluvial flooding took 
everyone completely by surprise. 
 
Environment Agency 
As a category 1 responder the Environment Agency (EA) has duties for a number of 
aspects of emergency planning and response. They are responsible for providing 
effective forecasts and warnings for river and sea flooding (Environment Agency, 
2008a), and during an emergency they are expected to work closely with the 
Meterological Office (MET Office) to monitor the probable impact of rainfall on local 
rivers, and warn the public, local Council, and emergency services of any potential 
hazards (Coulthard et. al. 2007a).  
 
Hull Community Wardens 
Hull’s Community Wardens are partially funded by the Council, and partially funded 
through national charitable organisations. They have a number of official duties for 
which the Council gives them targets, including cleaning up graffiti, patrolling streets, 
tending to overgrown areas of land, and reporting fly-tipping (NaSA Community 
Wardens 2008). In addition to this the Wardens undertake a vast array of initiatives 
generated internally by the Wardens themselves, such as distributing energy saving 
light bulbs, a service to tag and photograph residents bicycles in order to prove 
ownership (and ultimately reduce theft), and visiting elderly or vulnerable residents to 
offer help and support. There are also 12 Warden ‘shops’ across the city where people 
can drop in for help and advice on a range of topics including problems with drugs 
and alcohol, advice on obtaining benefits and aid, and help finding employment.  
 
Managing the disaster 
The time immediately after a large-scale hazard has struck constitutes a massive 
managerial task (Smith and Ward 1998). Responses to these events come not just 
from governmental agencies, but also from the private sector, voluntary and non-
governmental organisations, and the general public (Tierney and Trainor 2003). These 
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groups and individuals need to address diverse and often unplanned-for challenges, 
under severe pressure in terms of both time and resources. As they do this they may 
need to incorporate new members and/or adapt their organisational structure as well 
as identify and utilize new resources (Tierney and Trainor 2003). Essentially they 
must generate strategies under difficult and pressing circumstances. Stallings and 
Quarantelli (1985) state that under these conditions there are regularly instances of 
organisations finding themselves undertaking new, unexpected tasks, or performing 
familiar tasks using innovative and unplanned methods. A number of authors have 
therefore concluded that a significant portion of disaster response behaviour is 
characterised by emergence rather than routine (Comfort 1999; Stallings and 
Quarantelli 1985; Tierney and Trainor 2003). Stallings and Quarantelli (2003) state 
that behaviours may be considered emergent if either the relationships among the 
individuals pursuing collective goals are new, or if the tasks being undertaken in 
pursuit of these goals are new.  
 
Emergence 
Emergence takes place within, and between organisations in the public sector, private 
sector, and among citizens (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985). Emergence has been 
described as behaviour that is not explicitly apparent from the parts of the system and 
when it then arises, is therefore unexpected, unplanned and inevitable in any complex 
system. An essential element of emergence is that it arises from interaction between 
agents. Unplanned action by one particular individual would not constitute an 
emergent behaviour, nor would activity by groups that was pre-planned or centrally 
directed. Emergence is evident when individuals or groups work together in 
unplanned or unanticipated ways, or new networks are formed in response to an event 
that would not have existed otherwise. Emergence may be evident in three general 
categories or behaviour following a disaster:  Emergent Groups, Emergent Networks, 
and Emergent Activities. 
 
Emergent Groups 
Emergent groups are made up of individuals who have informally banded together in 
order to pursue some common goal or necessary function. Sometimes, they form in 
terms of occupational roles, but at other times their formation is along social, or 
geographic lines. Emergent groups made up entirely of public officials, entirely of 
private citizens, and combinations of the two have been identified, with group 
compositions varying considerably in terms of age, sex, race and lifestyle. They 
generally have a relatively flat hierarchy, relatively unspecialised roles within the 
group, and generally an absence of a designated leader (Stallings and Quarantelli 
1985). Emergent groups perform a variety of tasks including damage assessment, 
search and rescue, distributing aid, and debris clearing. After forming, these groups 
generally persist for only a short time, hours or perhaps a few days (Stallings and 
Quarentelli 1985). 
 
There was evidence of Hull’s residents forming emergent groups over and beyond 
what would have been anticipated and expected due to existing emergency 
contingency plans by the groups involved, and their pre-determined arrangements for 
working together in such situations (e.g. the pre-ordained arrangements in the levels 
of gold, silver and bronze commands). Coulthard et. al. (2007b) report of residents 
forming groups to provide emergency medical assistance, though it was not possible 
to ascertain to what extent those belonging to these groups knew each other prior to 
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the event, or what factors facilitated their coming together. Clearly though they were 
performing an essential task, and doing so without any prior planning, responsibilities 
or authority.  
 
Emergent groups also formed entirely from public officials. The testimony of a 
number of staff in one Area Team clearly demonstrated that very rapidly after the 
floods various Council service providers, Council housing groups, Community 
Wardens, and the Area Team themselves co-located in a single building in order to 
tackle the task of assessing which residents were in greatest need, and attempting to 
meet that need. Though this was partially caused by one Council premises being 
rendered inoperable, the other individuals that worked from the site did so voluntarily.  
 
The team of Council staff and Wardens assembled to carry out the door-to-door flood 
surveys also constitute an emergent group. At the time of the floods the Wardens 
appear to have been working relatively autonomously of the Council. The Council 
would set the targets mentioned previously, but then the Wardens were free to act 
wherever they perceive a need. The Wardens had no official flood related duties at the 
time of the floods, nor had they been involved in any Council emergency planning 
activities. The Wardens continued officially working as part of the Area Teams until 
November 2007. 
 
The team had both new structure (in that those in the group were unfamiliar working 
with each other) and new functions (conducting door to door surveys was entirely 
novel to all those involved). The formation of the group was also not the result of 
protocol or long term planning; rather it was a decision made in response to a 
perceived need. The membership of this group also changed significantly over time, 
with indications from those involved that many staff left after a few days of the work, 
while others joined. Cited as a feature of emergent groups by Stallings and 
Quarentelli (1985), this dynamic membership appears to have occurred because the 
staff available to take part changed on a daily (sometimes hourly) basis due to 
pressures elsewhere in the system caused either by the dynamic nature of the floods 
themselves, or other internal or external influences, such as their own personal issues 
regarding own residence flooding, or existing administrative duties for established 
local procedures that had to be maintained beyond the additional strain of flood 
damage duties, to name just a few.  
 
Emergent groups also formed from combinations of public officials, residents and the 
emergency services. There were a number of examples of residents ‘lending a hand’ 
to the fire brigade or police as they evacuated vulnerable residents. The same was true 
for Council staff; as outlined previously, once senior member of the Council Area 
Team worked with firemen to evacuate a number of elderly residents. 
 
Emergent Networks 
A network is an organisational form distinct from others such as bureaucracies, 
markets and hierarchies (Tierney and Trainor 2003), and have been defined by 
Podolny and Page (2003) as consisting of “a set of entities that pursue repeated 
enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate 
organisational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the 
exchange”. Rather than formal procedures such as contracts or policies, exchanges 
within a network are regulated by trust and reciprocity (Podolny and Page 2003). In 
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the context of a disaster response scenario, networks form because there is often not a 
pre-defined method of coordination between certain organisations, or these methods 
are too slow to be responsive in a crisis milieu.  
 
There was evidence that networks emerged during the flood response at all levels of 
organisations. Testimony from those involved in various organisational incident 
rooms consistently shows that there were regular communications with agencies in 
order to coordinate action and gain information about the ongoing situation. As 
observed by Podolny and Page (2003), the groups rely on altruism, reciprocity as well 
as a sense of ‘manners’. Descriptions such as ‘to help them out’, ‘courtesy’ and 
‘informal’ were regularly used by those interviewed when discussing the reasons why 
contact was made with different organisations during the flood response. 
 
Networks also emerged at a local level, specifically from the Council’s Area Team. 
As discussed above the Area Team grouped with a number of other service providers, 
it also formed network links with others. These included charities, housing 
associations, and social care groups. Again the reasoning behind forming the 
communication links was to coordinate actions, and gather information; generally in 
order to identify vulnerable residents. 
 
A pattern that appeared during discussions with the Wardens and Council Area Team 
was that it was often easier to communicate laterally with other agencies in the same 
location, than it was to communicate vertically within an organisation. There were a 
number of examples where there were long delays in receiving feedback or 
instructions from superiors (such as those in incident rooms or Silver Command), 
while staff could speak with their opposite numbers in other agencies or groups much 
more rapidly and reach joint decisions. This appears to be due to the fact that because 
the senior management sections of organisations act as central information processing 
nodes they were much more prone to ‘information overload’ during the early stages of 
the event; they simply did not have the capacity to take in all the required information 
from various sources and at the same time coordinate their numerous resources. 
Teams at lower organisational levels seemed to experience this to a much lesser 
degree, and this seems to be a key driver in the formation of emergent network links. 
These observations imply that the centrality of an organisational network, defined by 
Janssen et. al. (2006) as the degree to which only few nodes in a system possess high 
structural importance and connectedness, may be an important factor in the speed and 
efficacy of a hazard response.  
 
An exception to this situation was the coordination between the EA and the Fire 
Brigade, who had requested a presence within the EA’s incident room from its point 
of inception, a situation also noted by Coulthard et. al. (2007a). In this case high-level 
strategic coordination appears to have been in place almost immediately, with the Fire 
Brigade deferring to the EA on matters of where to place pumps, and which 
infrastructure to protect. 
 
Emergent Activities 
Emergent Activities are those activities which actors engage in that are novel or 
unusual for them in some way, particularly when these activities differ from those laid 
out in disaster plans (Tierney and Trainor 2003). They may be undertaken by 
emergent or pre-existing groups, organisations or by individual citizens acting 
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autonomously. In this context emergent activities include both those activities which 
are entirely new to an actor, and those where performing the function itself may be 
familiar, but the methods or equipment used or the context of the activity are novel. 
As with the other forms of emergence the impetus to undertake these activities is due 
to a recognition on behalf of the actors that there is an urgent need for some form of 
action, and simultaneously recognition that official action will not be forthcoming in 
the necessary timeframe (Stallings and Quarantelli 1985). 
 
A range of emergent activities can be identified from the evidence gathered, with 
residents and officials of all levels engaging in novel activities beyond the scope of 
their role; many of these activities were highly beneficial to the response effort. Table 
1 lists a number of activities identified as being emergent, together with who 
performed them, and an indication of the agency that holds responsibility for 
undertaking such actions. 
 
It is clear that emergent activities cover a large range of different types of actions 
including administrative and social tasks, provision of emergency aid, and advice 
giving. Emergent activities were carried out by individuals (such as single local 
residents), emergent groups (as outlined in a previous section), and organisations 
(such as the Community Wardens). 
 
Emergent activities fell into two groups, those novel activities that were undertaken 
voluntarily, and those where a group was ‘tasked’ with a novel activity. The activities 
of the Community Wardens provide example of both of these, with their evacuation 
of vulnerable residents and provision of care packages to residents an example of the 
former group, while their involvement in traffic control duties and door –to-door 
surveying examples of the later.  
 
Table 1. Illustrative list of emergent activities identified during the response to 
the 2007 floods 
Activity Actor Agency usually responsible 
Evacuations Numerous, including: Community 
Wardens, local Area Team staff, 
emergency services, volunteer 
lifeguards, local residents, army 
Emergency services 
Provision of ‘Care 
Packs’ (Food etc.) 
Community Wardens, charities N/A 
Traffic Control Police, Community Wardens, local 
Area Team staff 
Police 
Door to Door Flood 
Surveys 
City Council staff, Community 
Wardens, local Area Team staff 
N/A 
Care and Support for 
Neighbours 
Local residents, charities N/A (possibly voluntary 
organisations or charities) 
Emergency Medical 
Assistance 
Local residents, emergency services Emergency services 
Building Sandbag Walls Local residents, EA, Fire Brigade, 
Community Wardens 
EA, possibly emergency 
services 
Assessing flood damage 
to properties 
City Council staff, Community 
Wardens, local Area Team staff 
Building surveyors 
Advising on obtaining 
benefits / talking to 
insurance companies 
Local residents, Community Wardens, 
local Area Team staff, city Council 
staff 
Citizens advice bureau, certain 
Council departments 
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The types of emergent activities engaged in changed as time progressed. In the early 
stages of the flooding they focused on ensuring that the most vulnerable residents 
were looked after, and the prevention of damage to property. Once the floods began to 
recede and it became clear that there was no immediate danger to life or health, 
actions became more focused on recovery; activities such as surveying and assessing 
flood damage and dispensing advice became more prevalent. It is also interesting to 
note that the emergent activities carried out during the recovery phase were often 
coordinated as part of a city wide effort by Silver Command or senior management; 
coordination that was absent during the response phase. 
 
While most of the activities outlined in Table 1 were largely constructive, there were 
examples of emergent activities creating difficulties or dangers. Most tragically, the 
man who died during the floods was attempting to clear a weed screen on a storm 
drain; a consistent opinion garnered from interviewees was that he should not have 
been engaged in this activity, as he did not have the skills, experience or equipment to 
perform such a hazardous task. 
 
Discussion 
The trigger for emergent behaviours almost always seems to be a desire to help 
alleviate human misery or ‘help out’. A consistent sentiment across all the 
organisations and individuals was ‘we did what we could’. The evidence from Hull 
shows that once a need is identified, and there is a perception among those ‘on hand’ 
that action through ‘usual’ channels cannot meet this need, emergent action is 
instigated. A common sentiment from the ground was that ‘something had to be 
done’, and people took action even if they were aware that there actions were only of 
minimal benefit. This seems to be related to the community spirit displayed in Hull 
over the course of the floods, with most people feeling a need to be seen to be 
‘contributing to the cause’. When the perceived need is not so urgent, i.e. in the days 
following the flooding, there were more frequent examples of people withdrawing 
from emergent activities. This was most obvious in the observations of several of 
those involved in carrying out door–to-door surveying. This observation appears to 
support Comfort (1999) who proposed that ‘identification of a common threat’ was a 
key prerequisite, indeed once the perception of a hazard begins to diminish, and 
peripheral actors begin leaving the response.  
 
Emergent behaviours of the types discussed above have been cited as a major source 
of resilience within disaster networks (Comfort 1999; Tierney and Trainor 2003).  
Emergent behaviour has the capacity to bring in a greater diversity of actors to the 
response system as well as capitalise on more diverse information sources and 
resource pools (Tierney and Trainor 2003). This happens because relationships are 
more informal, and new actors can rapidly be brought into the network when needed. 
Beunza and Stark (2003, in Tierney and Trainor 2003) also note that this diversity 
enhances the flexibility of the system by increasing the possibility that interactions 
will yield unpredictable solutions or unpredicted resources, referring to this capacity 
as ‘generative redundancy’. This situation can be contrasted with a rigid 
hierarchically structured response system, where due to the centralisation of control of 
the system, there is less diversity in terms of information exchange because all nodes 
receive the same information from the central node (Janssen et. al. 2006) 
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The flow of information also seems to be important in facilitating emergence. 
Because during the early stages of the flooding information and instruction was not 
forthcoming from senior levels of organisation, actors on the ground appear to have 
acted upon information available to them, including their local knowledge and that 
provided by residents. In essence in the absence of organisational directives coming 
down from above, people and groups self-organised according to the information 
available. With regard to the overall picture of the Council’s flood response, a senior 
official involved with Silver Command commented: 
A lot of what we did just evolved, and it was due to the people involved in 
those processes. What we realised was that there wasn’t the basic 
understanding of how the whole process was supposed to work. A lot of what 
we did was fine and we’d want to see it again, you’d just get things moving. 
What we didn’t have was an understanding of the protocols and who could 
action decisions. 
 
Once communication from senior levels became forthcoming, groups re-organised 
according to this new source of information, and began undertaking activities that 
were a part of a more citywide coordinated response. This illustrates the adaptability 
of emergent behaviours, as well as the evolution of the response system over time; an 
observation which supports the assertions of Comfort (1999). 
 
Stallings and Quarantelli (1985) argue that the looseness and informality of emergent 
behaviour is one of their real strengths. Because of the lack of formal mechanisms or 
rules regulating behaviour, emergent groups are much more able to alter their 
activities rapidly and undertake necessary, possibly novel, tasks (Stallings and 
Quarantelli 1985; Tierney and Trainor 2003). A further adaptive benefit of emergent 
behaviours is that, generally, they give rise to less centrality in the response network. 
This means they are less dependent on a few central hubs (such as command centres 
or executive personnel), and therefore less vulnerable to the loss or incapacitation of 
these hubs (Janssen et. al. 2006). For example, a highly centralised system may cease 
to function almost entirely if a command centre is removed, because it is located in an 
area effected by the disaster. 
 
It should also be noted that while emergent behaviours have a number of beneficial 
effects they can also have detrimental effects. The lack of clear ‘leaders’ within 
emergent groups, and to a certain extent emergent networks also, means that external 
groups and agencies can find it difficult to develop relationships with it, which can in 
turn cause logistical issues with delivering aid and support (Stallings and Quarantelli 
1985). Research has also shown that the ability to operate in a network is a skill that 
must be learned (Podolny and Page 1998), therefore the success of an emergent 
network may be related to the experience of the actors involved. 
 
The immediate response to the 2007 Hull Floods shows the value of emergent groups, 
networks and activities in conjunction with formal disaster response plans. Emergent 
behaviours by and large functioned positively to fill the gaps in information flow and 
actions that the formal emergency response structures could not fill. Emergence was 
especially evident during the early phase of the disaster whilst the Silver Command 
was still being established. Emergent behaviours and local self-organisation also 
helped in dealing with the sheer number of individual incidence requiring immediate 
attention, such as the safe evacuation of vulnerable residents. 
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The evidence for emergence in the response to the Hull Floods does not undermine 
the valuable role played by formal emergency planning and response measures. 
However, the Hull experience shows that such plans are necessary but not sufficient 
in responding to disasters. In any disaster there will inevitably be a time lag between 
the initiation of the event and the formal response of the authorities. Hierarchical co-
ordination is very important, but will inevitably result in some inefficiencies in 
communication and decision making under rapidly changing and dangerous 
conditions.  
 
Emergent structures and functions serve to provide rapid feedback and response to 
changing environmental conditions during a disaster. In addition to formal emergency 
planning, disaster resilience requires that local communities exhibit the conditions 
necessary for emergence to occur. This is exemplified by the role that was played by 
the Hull Community Wardens. These community based workers did not have any 
formal role in Hull emergency plans but their local knowledge and existing 
community networks were extremely valuable during the disaster. Informal 
relationships between individuals working for Hull City Council and the Environment 
Agency were also essential in the identification of the disaster and the early response. 
Such relationships and skills will never be entirely or effectively captured in formal 
emergency plans. The significance if this for civic leaders is that disaster resilience is 
enhanced by stronger community networks and relationships, which may be 
facilitated by grass roots community workers who are able to act on local knowledge 
and experience despite being outside formal disaster plans and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this investigation was to determine to what extent emergent 
behaviours were evident in the response effort during the Hull floods of June 2007. 
An attempt was also made to determine the relative prevalence of different forms of 
emergent behaviour, together with an attempt to identify certain systemic features that 
facilitate or inhibit emergence. 
 
As the preceding discussion shows there were examples of each type of emergent 
behaviour predicted in the literature; emergent groups, networks, and activities. 
Overall these emergent behaviours were largely constructive. This was especially 
noticeable in the provision of timely assistance to Hull’s most vulnerable residents. A 
common thread through all emergent behaviours identified was altruism, which was 
most often expressed in a desire to help or sense of ‘courtesy’. There was however 
some evidence where certain unplanned activities were not constructive, even though 
these were universally undertaken with a strong desire to help.  
What is clear however is that emergence played an important role in Hull’s response 
to the June 2007 floods, and without these behaviours the misery and suffering 
experienced by Hull’s residents would likely have been far greater. In the wider 
context of disaster management these results imply that a better understanding of the 
contextual factors that give rise to emergence, together with knowledge of how 
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emergent behaviours interact with more traditional organisational forms, is of great 
importance to ensure the resilience in the face of uncertain future hazards. 
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